Twenty-four hour justice
Against this backdrop, the recent remarks of CJI: Justice Surya Kant acquire constitutional significance. The Chief Justice observed that the judiciary must evolve into a system functioning like hospitals offering twenty-four hour emergency services so as to address the “pain and agony of the common man.” The emphasis upon artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure and technological integration was presented as the future of judicial administration.
The proposition undoubtedly possesses administrative appeal. During the COVID period, Indian courts indeed continued functioning through virtual means while many constitutional systems globally struggled to adapt. Technology widened access to urgent hearings and enabled continuity of constitutional adjudication. Article 39A of the Constitution itself mandates equal access to justice and affordable legal remedies.
Yet the metaphor comparing courts to hospitals appears only partially reasoned because it overlooks the duality embedded within the healthcare system itself.
India does not operate through a singular healthcare model. Parallel systems exist simultaneously. Government hospitals struggle with infrastructural inadequacies, shortage of personnel and overcrowding, while private hospitals function through market driven economics sustained by insurance systems, deductibles and high treatment costs. Access to superior medical treatment frequently depends upon financial capability notwithstanding constitutional promises concerning the right to life under Article 21.
A similar parallel reality increasingly manifests within the legal profession. Senior advocates now command appearance fees calculated almost by the minute. Star studded legal representation has itself become a form of institutional capital. Constitutional remedies theoretically remain accessible to every citizen equally under Article 14, yet the magnitude of relief often appears proportionate to the quality and expense of representation available before constitutional courts.
The common litigant therefore confronts two simultaneous judicial systems: one doctrinally constitutional and another practically economic.
In this context, the remarks previously attributed to DY Chandrachud become particularly relevant when the Court observed in substance that constitutional courts cannot enter a “parallel universe of facts” merely because one side insists upon it. Ironically, the justice delivery system itself increasingly appears to operate within parallel universes of access and representation.
Transparency and temperament
A litigant seeks reassurance that the courtroom remains institutionally detached from personal hostility, prejudice or favouritism. That concern becomes particularly significant within trial courts and subordinate courts.
An incident illustrative of this concern reportedly arose during proceedings before a Court of Civil Judge Senior Division in South Goa. During the hearing of Inventory Proceedings, the presiding officer is stated to have openly remarked in Court that certain interested parties standing at the back row appeared familiar because they were allegedly seen residing in the vicinity of the Judge’s own locality of residence. The Court reportedly observed that either transfer of the proceedings or a consent application from the concerned parties may become necessary.
The difficulty, however, did not end there. The daily Roznama allegedly recorded that the Power of Attorney holder of one litigant had not expressed willingness to participate in an inquiry concerning co heirs. Yet the Roznama reportedly remained silent regarding the far more constitutionally significant disclosure emanating from the Bench itself concerning possible apprehensions of bias.
The deeper constitutional concern remains judicial temperament and procedural fairness.
Ridge versus Baldwin
It is here that Ridge v Baldwin (1964) assumes relevance. The judgment fundamentally restored the doctrine that legality alone does not legitimise exercise of power unless procedural fairness accompanies it. Justice must not merely be delivered. Justice must appear to be delivered through conduct that reassures the ordinary litigant.
If a courtroom disclosure itself generates apprehension in the mind of a prudent litigant that institutional neutrality may stand compromised, can the official record of proceedings remain silent about that disclosure while selectively recording procedural omissions attributable to one side? Such silence itself becomes constitutionally consequential because the official Roznama represents the institutional memory of the Court.
The principle emerging from Ridge v Baldwin is not confined to final orders alone. It concerns the atmosphere in which authority is exercised.
Cure through candour
The judiciary undoubtedly requires technological advancement, digital integration and infrastructural modernisation. Yet judicial gaffes cannot be cured merely through speed, artificial intelligence or round the clock functioning. Transparency must accompany expediency.
Official audio visual recording of proceedings, authenticated courtroom transcripts and accurate recording within daily Roznamas may perhaps strengthen institutional confidence more effectively than merely increasing disposal statistics. Transparency protects both judges and litigants alike because it creates an objective constitutional memory immune from selective recollection.
In a constitutional democracy, dissent concerning judicial administration cannot automatically be equated with institutional disrespect. Article 19(1)(a) protects fair criticism expressed within the reasonable restrictions contemplated under Article 19(2). Courts derive legitimacy not from insulation against criticism, but from public confidence that constitutional power continues to be exercised with restraint, fairness and visible neutrality.
